Those called to office in the church are to lead a life of obedience to Scripture and in conformity to the historic confessional standards of the church. Among these standards is the requirement to live either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman (W-4.9001), or chastity in singleness. Persons refusing to repent of any self-acknowledged practice which the confessions call sin shall not be ordained and/or installed as deacons, elders, or ministers of the Word and Sacrament. (Book of Order, G-6.0106b)

What the Covenant Network erroneously contends in
"Interpreting Book of Order G-6.0106b":
"SELF ACKNOWLEDGED"

Fallacy: Examining bodies must investigate whether single persons are celibate.

Application of G 6.0106b normally starts with a candidate's "self acknowledgment" of unrepentant sin. If there is no "self acknowledgment," sessions and presbyteries normally need not address questions about chastity, repentance, or what the Confessions call sin.

1. A candidate's self acknowledgment of sexual practice must be plain, palpable and obvious. Sessions and presbyteries cannot try to infer self acknowledgment from anything less.

• Being open about one's same sex orientation does not constitute self acknowledgement of sexual practice. An openly same sex orientation is not a bar to ordained service.
• Living in a committed, same sex relationship should not be a bar to ordained service (and should not create any presumption of sexual activity). This is discussed further at page 10 of this paper.

2. As a practical matter, sessions and presbyteries may inquire specifically about a person's sexual practice only if

• The candidate chooses to disclose that s/he is sexually active; or
• An accuser comes forward after personally having been party to, or witnessed, a sexual act.

3. In such circumstances, the candidate has the right to decide whether to discuss his/her sexual practice or not. If the candidate declines to tell the examining body whether or not s/he is sexually active

• The candidate should help session/presbytery understand why s/he believes that is not central to an assessment of fitness for example, given that person's interpretation of G 6.0106b (which session/presbytery may decide is sound) or reasons why an accuser is not reliable.
• Sessions and presbyteries may find the candidate fit for office even if s/he refuses to discuss his/her sexual practice.

Critique of the Covenant Network's Interpretation of
"Self-Acknowledged"
By Gordon E. Fish

The writers want you to think that ... a candidate can be disqualified under G-6.0106b only after: (1) self-acknowledgment that can only be in the form of specific verbal admission of a prohibited sexual act or (2) testimony from an accuser who has witnessed or participated in a sexual act involving the candidate. Such a straw man standard is unrealistic and not supported by the Book of Order or General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission (GAPJC) [our highest church court] decisions. It misleads examining bodies and focuses attention solely on physical acts to the exclusion of the broader understanding of sin in the Reformed tradition.

Although no single source completely defines how an examining body properly complies with G-6.0106b, several GAPJC decisions do provide insight, especially regarding "self-acknowledgment." They raise three general questions:

• What threshold of information compels an examining body to inquire about a candidate's compliance with G-6.0106b?
• What are the limits on such an inquiry -- what questions can be asked?
• Are there questions a candidate can refuse to answer?

Examples of how the writers go wrong:

1. Selective Quotation of the GAPJC:
The writers premise their understanding of "self-acknowledgment" with a quotation from a GAPJC decision(1) that is wrested from its context by a critical omission of all but the final words: "Self-acknowledgment may come in many forms. In whatever form it may take, self-acknowledgment must be plain, palpable, and obvious...."

According to the dictionary, "to acknowledge" means to show by word or act that one has knowledge of and agrees to a fact or truth. Contrary to what the writers would have us believe, self-acknowledgment can occur as well by action as by actual words. The GAPJC clearly recognized as much. Nothing from the PJC or Book of Order substantiates the limits on self-acknowledgment the writers want you to mistakenly see.

2. Improperly Constraining Candidate Examination:
The writers attempt to muzzle proper examination of candidates. While the Wier decision establishes that a candidate's sexual orientation by itself is not sufficient to trigger inquiry, it makes clear that other known evidence must also be considered: "If the governing body has reasonable cause for inquiry based on its knowledge of the life and character of the candidate, it has the positive obligation to make due inquiry and uphold all the standards for ordination and installation." Nothing in the GAPJC's rulings excludes a candidate's acknowledged orientation from the totality of evidence that must be considered.

What is "reasonable cause"? From the San Joaquin v. Presbytery of Redwoods decision we know that "mere hunch, gossip or stereotype" in isolation isn't enough. But any other publicly known information that is supported by specifics -- when, where, and how the information became known -- must be considered. Such information may involve anything the candidate has said or written, unless disclosed in circumstances that made it confidential. Authenticated reports of public action or activity are also unquestionably fair game. For example, knowledge that a candidate openly shares a residence with another unrelated, unmarried person of either gender is certainly pertinent, even if it isn't conclusive. Substantiated reports of public display of affection may legitimately be considered. It is highly misleading for the writers to confound the pertinence of a given piece of evidence with the adequacy of that piece.

The writers invoke Benton et al. v. Hudson River Presbytery to imply that persons living together in a "committed, same-sex relationship" should not be presumed to be sexually active. This claim drastically over-reaches. Even if Benton allows ministers to bless non-conjugal, same-sex relationships, it is completely silent as to church office. Would the writers have us assume that two people living together in a committed, heterosexual relationship are not presumptively sexually active? An examining body would be remiss not to ask questions of all candidates known to be living with another unrelated person in a self-described, committed relationship.

An examining body is required to consider the totality of its knowledge of the candidate, giving due weight to all accredited evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, and to make good-faith inquiry if there is reasonable cause to believe a candidate does not qualify for office under G-6.0106b.

3. Inventing Precedent
The writers would have you believe that the case of Hair et al. v. First Presbyterian Church of Stamford created a binding precedent that candidates don't have to answer questions of an examining session or presbytery. Wrong! The Hair case followed a tortured path involving two trials and sets of appeals. The writers pointedly minimize a crucial fact: the GAPJC never ruled on any of Hair's substantive issues(2) and thus created no precedent. In PCUSA polity, only the GAPJC can issue authoritative interpretations that create constitutional law; PJCs of lower governing bodies do not create binding precedent. The writers' premise is fatally flawed.

4. Encouraging the Candidate to Manipulate the Examination Process
The writers incite the candidate to use the Hair case to mislead an examining body regarding his/her refusal to answer questions, including those related to his/her sexual practice. The examining body is obliged by our connectionalism to conduct its examination on behalf of the whole church, using standards that are corporately determined. It is not the prerogative of the candidate to tell the examining body how to do its job or the examining body to disregard the standards.

Candidacy for office is voluntary in Presbyterian polity, and the examination process is not a tribunal. As part of a voluntary process, a candidate for church office, like jobseekers in the workplace, agrees to a level of scrutiny that implies the waiving of certain protections. The candidate consents to inquiry that might in other circumstances seem invasive. Ministerial candidates routinely are required to undergo psychological evaluation and waive their right to confidentiality, so their Committee on Preparation can receive the report. Ministers also have to fully self-acknowledge any pending charges or past convictions for sexual misconduct. Likewise, schoolteachers, Little League coaches, Scout leaders, and medical personnel are routinely required to be fingerprinted, pass a criminal background test, or take drug tests. Automobile drivers give implied consent to take a breathalyzer test, in some cases even on a random basis. While these actions would be illegal if imposed on the public at random, none of them violates the subjects' civil rights or the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. In each case, the subject can avoid scrutiny by giving up a corresponding privilege being sought. A candidate for Presbyterian office cannot unilaterally declare that any area relating to qualification for ordination or installation is off limits, whether it concerns theology or personal conduct. A candidate who refuses to answer pertinent questions that an examining body needs to carry out its obligations cannot legitimately claim to accept the governance of the church.

Some general observations:

• Church law has not established what standard of proof is required to disqualify a candidate under G-6.0106b before ordination or installation.(3) The Constitution does not specify and the GAPJC has not addressed the issue. Arguably, a candidate's refusal to answer a relevant question about sexual practice renders his/her examination incomplete and therefore insufficient to permit ordination/installation if other clear and compelling evidence reasonably indicates the person may not have complied with G-6.0106b.
• The consideration of adultery in divorce proceedings provides some useful parallels and guidance. Family courts recognize that the often secretive nature of adultery generally precludes evidence of activity flagrante delicto. Accordingly, it normally suffices to provide circumstantial evidence showing, in combination, disposition (i.e. inclination) and opportunity. For example, the accused spouse and paramour have been seen kissing, hugging, or the like, and the couple was seen entering a motel room and leaving an hour later.
• The examination of a candidate is not a tribunal; the right of an accused person in a disciplinary case to remain silent and not testify in his/her defense is not directly applicable. Even if the examination were a trial, a witness's right to remain silent is broken once a line of questioning has been opened. Thus a candidate who has begun to answer questions about a committed relationship (homosexual or heterosexual) arguably is required to answer all reasonable questions about that relationship and cannot change his/her mind without withdrawing from candidacy.

A final thought:
At an even deeper level, "Interpreting G-6" is disturbing for recommending subterfuge and denial to elude the clear intent of the Constitution. Even if a potential office bearer in some circumstances may have no constitutional duty to disclose sexual activity, such a person still has a high moral obligation as a member of the community of faith (James 5.12). Our relationship is sustained by members who live open, transparent, and exemplary lives (Matt. 5.16; 2 Cor. 6:3, 11-13); secrecy and deception flout our covenantal accountability to live in mutual submission under the authority of Jesus Christ as revealed in Holy Scripture (Eph. 5:21; James 5.16; C-5.101).

1.Wier v. Second Presbyterian Church of Ft. Lauderdale, GAPJC Remedial Case 214-5.

2.After the initial Presbytery PJC trial, the Synod PJC on appeal ruled that the examination in question was incomplete because the candidate, who was admittedly in a homosexual relationship, refused to answer a question about his sexual activity. On re-examination, the candidate again refused, claiming he was “chaste in God’s sight.” On re-trial, the Presbytery PJC ruled the examination complete and the Synod PJC affirmed. The GAPJC dismissed the case as moot because the elder’s term expired before the lengthy proceedings were complete.

3.In McKittrick v. West End Church (GAPJC 215-5), the GAPJC ruled that an officer, once ordained or installed, can be removed only by a disciplinary proceeding, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Gordon E. Fish, Ph.D., is an elder and member of Grace Presbyterian Church, Montclair, NJ, and serves as a member of the board of the Presbyterian Coalition. Dr. Fish is a solid-state physicist and is registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. He assisted the late Julius B. Poppinga in preparing the Londonderry and Benton judicial cases and argued both before the GAPJC.

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